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Brief historical overview 
The analysis of the economic effects of trade unions  on  labour  markets  has evolved in a quite unsteady
way, with empirical  findings  posing  theoretical unsolved puzzles and  theoretical  analyses  being  either
almost  absent  or amazingly prolific (Pencavel, 1991). 
In the industrial relations literature many hypotheses on  the  incidence and structure of collective
bargaining were developed a long time ago.  These, along  with  some  standard  economic  theory
analyses,  motivated  quite  an important amount of empirical research. At this  early  stage  and  until  the
late sixties, economic  theorists  generally  considered   trade   unions   as institutions that would shift the
labour supply curve but would not  influence the competitive characteristics of the labour market. 
The fact that the wage level observed  was  different  depending  on  the presence or absence of a union
stimulated an upsurge of empirical research  on the effects of unions on wage setting.  Thus,  this  early
work  was  devoted mainly to explaining  or  verifying  the  existence  of  a  wage  gap  between unionised
and non unionised firms, industries  and/or  countries  (see  Lewis, 1986 for a survey). In doing so,
researchers were faced with  the  dilemma  of defining an adequate utility function for the union to
maximise,  of  choosing the appropriate decision variables and, to a  smaller  extent,  of  finding  a suitable
way of including the characteristics of workers and firms  among  the determinants of unionism. However,
as Johnson (1975) noted, there was still no consensus on unions' goals while theoretical foundations were
still  missing. Moreover, despite the many  case  studies  which  were  carried  out,  various
methodological issues were not addressed  during  this  period,  such  as  how critically the models relied
on the exogeneity of the  variables  involved  or whether it was possible to obtain similar results with
different  assumptions on the utility functions and bargaining processes. Despite these shortcomings, the
analyses brought out many stylised facts that  fed  into  the  theoretical research. 
One of the first aims of economic theorists was to explain the bargaining processes by which outcomes
arose and to discuss the optimality or  efficiency of these outcomes. However, for this to be done
rigorously,  the  analysis  of unions' preferences had  to  be  thoroughly  revised  so  that  the  variables
included in the bargaining  agenda  could  be  clearly  determined .  Although researchers have been
discussing the issue for decades (Dunlop, 1944 and Ross, 1948 are early references), there is as yet no
consensus on unions  caring  or not about the level of employment.  Empirical  evidence  is  inconclusive3
as, although observed contracts do not generally include  clauses  on  employment, some studies have
shown that employment does matter to unions  (Farber,  1978; Dertouzos and Pencavel, 1981; Carruth and
Oswald, 1985 are examples). 
 In any case, the first models  developed  assumed  that  bargaining  took place only over the wage  level,
thus  implying  that  management  determined employment unilaterally according to  the  labour  demand
curve.  Two  models became quite popular, depending on the role  assigned  to  management  in  the
negotiations: if it was to take the wage as given -set by the union- then  the monopoly union model (the
origin of which is attributed to Dunlop,  1944)  was proposed, while if it was assumed to bargain with the
union to  determine  the wage  level  the  right-to-manage  model  was  considered  as  an  appropriate
description (Nickell, 1982). The models yielded similar predictions,  although in the latter the resulting
wage level was lower than in the former, as  firms would have some bargaining power . However, both
implied that the outcome  was Pareto non efficient, that is, that the wage-employment  pair  observed
would generally be worse, for at least one party, than other possible outcomes. This gave rise, once again,
to  the  debate  on  the  inclusion/exclusion  of  the employment level as a union goal, although this time
for  theoretical  instead of empirical reasons. 
The above argument led to the  formulation  of  the  efficient  contracts model (MacDonald and Solow,
1981), in which unions and management were assumed to bargain simultaneously over both  wages  and
employment,  so  that  Pareto optimality was guaranteed. The wage-employment outcomes predicted
would lay on the contract curve, to the right of the  labour  demand.  However,  the  model would still be
inconsistent with the observed fact that  negotiations  do  not generally include employment explicitly in
the bargaining agenda (see  Oswald, 1993 for a recent extensive survey). 
Many empirical studies were carried out  during  this  period  trying  to assess the reliability  of  the
different  formulations  in  explaining  real phenomena. Moreover, some researchers tried to select among
them testing their validity for specific data sets (Brown  and  Ashenfelter,  1986;  Card,  1986; among
others). However, the procedures  used  have  been  recently  criticised because  of  not  being  robust  to
changes  in  the  underlying  assumptions (Pencavel, 1991; Manning, 1994). Hence, the adequacy of the
models  should be seen as  a  major  empirical  research  topic,  as  the  implications  of  the alternative
formulations  are  very  different.  Firstly,  the  efficiency  or  inefficiency of the outcome is important in
terms of the behaviour of  agents. To assume that the parties ignore a potential gain  as  is  the  case  in4
the right-to-manage and monopoly union models, could cast doubts on  the  adequacy of the bargaining
process proposed. Secondly, small wage increases and/or  low wage levels could be attributed to the union
caring about employment or to the firm rejecting the union's proposed wage  and  succeeding.  Again,  the
above implies different objective functions and bargaining frameworks. Finally,  the efficient contracts
model predicts a higher level of employment over the cycle than  that  resulting  from  the  right-to-manage
and  the   monopoly   union  formulations, in which employment is, further, unaffected by union
"bargaining power" over this variable. 
During the second half of the  seventies  and  the  early  eighties,  the debate on union preferences  and
goals  as  well  as  on  which  of  the  two formulations was more suitable -both theoretically and
empirically- was  still widespread. One approach to reconcile the assumption of  efficiency  with  the
unobserved bargaining over employment was developed in the implicit  contracts theory. According to
this view, uncertainty on the economic environment to be faced and the assumption that workers need to
have an insurance against  'bad' states of nature, would promote the design  of  contracts  contingent  on
the future economic performance, unknown ex ante but observed by both  parties  ex post (Baily, 1974;
Azariadis, 1975). Thus, the risk aversion  of  the  parties would justify that they accepted a contract in
which  they  would  share  the risk. Further developments proposed employment contingent contracts
(Calvo and Phelps, 1977). Assuming that the firms would possess better  information  than workers about
the state of nature and that workers  would  never  observe  the value of certain variables, the only way
to prevent  the  firm  from  cheating once the wage was set, would be to link the  wage  to  the
employment  level. Alternative formulations based  on  private  information  further  added  some insight
to the approach (see Oswald, 1986b). Despite the  resulting  contracts were optimum, the approach was
criticised mainly because  real  contracts  are generally very simple while contingent contracts would be
not only complex  to design but very difficult to monitor (Oswald,  1986a). Further,  as  wages  are
generally settled for a fixed period of time while employment  is  not,  there would always exist an
incentive for the firm to default. Some authors  argued, however, that the existence of a union itself as well
as the  repeated  nature of union-management relationships could be enforcing the contract  (Malcomson,
1983). 
A second line of research restated  the  union's  preferences.  Two  main arguments were put forward.
First, if the implicit rule for firing workers was "first in, last out", then seniority would be an  important
variable  to  be taken into account in specifying union's preferences. Under the new scheme  it was shown5
that it was possible to obtain the efficient outcome at the point in which the marginal revenue of labour
equals the wage (Grossman, 1983;  Oswald, 1985; Oswald, 1993). An analogous result was obtained if
the utility  function of the union was specified differently depending on employment  being  smaller or
greater than membership. Once it was considered that  the  union's  concern over employment would
disappear when  all  members  got  a  job,  the  union's indifference curves would become horizontal and,
again, it would  be  possible that the tangency between isoprofit contours and indifference curves would
be lying on the labour demand curve (Oswald, 1985; Carruth and Oswald, 1987) . 
Another proposed way to  overcome  the  obstacle  of  imposing  a  priori restrictions on the structure of
bargaining was to include other variables  in the agenda, that would be negotiated separately of the  wage.
Thus,  although actual contracts do not include any  statement  on  employment,  it  could  be thought that
indirect agreements on this matter would be negotiated in further stages -such as the assignment of
workers to machines- or that wage bargaining might be done at a centralised level while employment
and/or other issues  are negotiated at the industry or firm level. At each stage the parties might have
different bargaining power, due to the union having an unequal interest on the variables or an unbalanced
capacity of summoning members for different issues. Models with these characteristics could be labelled
multistage  or  sequential bargaining models (Manning, 1987;  Card,  1990;  Johnson,  1990).  Their  main
consequence is that if the wage is set in a first stage and  employment  in  a second one, the model would
nest the three previous formulations and empirical tests on the significance of the  parameters  could  be
used as  a  means  of identifying the bargaining procedure that is relevant for a specific data set. The
outcome predicted by the multistage model would be somewhere  between  the labour demand curve result
and the contract curve  outcome  depending  on  the relative bargaining powers. Thus, from a theoretical
point of view, efficiency would be possible but is neither imposed nor subject  to  a  specific  utility
function. Still, the possibility of agents cooperating to obtain a non optimum employment-wage outcome
under certain  circumstances  would  remain.  However, since the difference in union  power  at  various
stages  is  the  origin  of inefficiency, the model might suggest a distinct direction of analysis related to
the determinants of union's strength. 
Finally, an alternative approach was to view the bargaining process as  a repeated instead of a one shot
game (Espinoza and Rhee,  1989).  The  repeated interaction among the parties would allow for reputation
effects  as  well  as for the possibility of their being punished in the future when deviating  from previous
agreements.  As  a  consequence,  incentive  compatibility  would  be guaranteed and it would be possible6
to observe an  efficient  outcome  without bargaining over employment. The right-to-manage and  the
efficient  contracts models would be special cases of this general formulation,  depending  on  the time
preferences of the parties and the discount rates they use. 
In the second half of the eighties, attention was  also  drawn  to  other aspects of the economics of trade
unions. The aim was basically to analyse how the predictions of the by then  standard  models  would  be
affected  by  the relaxation  of  some  of  their  simplifying  assumptions.  Among  them,   the hypothesis
of fixed membership was revised in different ways. One  example  is Sampson (1988) in which
membership is endogenous and where uncertainty is also incorporated by allowing  for  a  stochastic
labour  demand  schedule.  Other  researchers addressed topics  such  as  the  effects  of  the  size  of
union membership; the free-rider problem -enjoy the benefits without  incurring  the costs- as well as the
implications  of  heterogeneous  members  (Booth,  1985;  Naylor, 1989; Booth and Ulph, 1990). Further,
for the  empirical  research  to better approximate real world processes,  it  was  necessary  to  modify
some aspects such as, for example, the static nature of the models.  The  inclusion of dynamics was
justified in terms of the existence of  employment  adjustment costs relative to negotiations themselves,
coordination, adjustment to shocks, etc. (Lockwood and Manning, 1989 is an example) and also on the
endogenisation of membership (Kidd and Oswald, 1987; Lockwood  and  Manning,  1987).  
Lastly, more attention started to be paid  to  the  role  played  by  unions  in  wage formation at a
macroeconomic level. Thus, the  analyses  tried  to  shed  some light on the way that unions' reaction  to
fiscal  policies  would  influence their formulation as well as on how the  policies  themselves  would
restrict unions' claims. The bargaining over wages was hence analysed as a game between a centralised
union  and  the  government,  the  result  of  which  would  be considered as an explanation of the
unemployment rate  evolution  in  previous decades. At the same time, decentralised bargaining was also
studied,  trying to evaluate the consequences of this different structure on the  macroeconomic regularities
observed (Calmfors, 1985) . Calmfors and Driffill (1988) addressed the issue of how the above two
different  settings  would  influence macroeconomic performance. 7
The state of the art 
Theoretical research on  the  economics  of  trade  unions  is  quite  profuse nowadays despite the apparent
decline of these  institutions  all  around  the world. One of the main reasons for this is the renewed
interest in  how  their presence and strength, as well as their structure and coverage, can affect the
expected  results  of  economic  policies.  In  a  world  where  deregulation, liberalisation and integration
are being  largely  discussed  and  implemented with very different results, the role of the  diverse
institutional  settings arises as a main issue. 
Are the structure  and  coverage  of  unionism  as  well  the  degree  of  co-ordination  in  bargaining,
features  that  help  explaining  the  unequal performance of different economies? Is it that economists
have not  yet  found an adequate model to represent the trade  union's  goals  and  the  bargaining process?
What are the consequences for investment, innovation and total factor productivity of the diverse
institutional settings? How can  the  presence  or absence of trade unions as well as their structure be
related to the evolution of employment and wages over the business cycle? Are they helpful  or  harmful
when firms and economies are subject to exogenous shocks? These  are  some  of the questions that
economists are attempting to answer by improving  both  the theoretical framework and the quality of
empirical studies. 
The concerns of theorists in the nineties might be divided in  two  broad categories. Firstly, there is a
considerable amount of  papers  that  continue and deepen the analysis of some of the  topics  brought  up
by  the  previous literature. Secondly, a renewed interest  in  the  critical  analysis  of  the structure of
bargaining models is being addressed. 
Regarding the first class of work, four main topics  can  be  identified. Firstly, centralised versus
decentralised bargaining. Although  some  work  on corporatism had been done by the end of the eighties,
Calmfors and  Driffill's (1988) paper gave rise to a huge amount of empirical and theoretical  research on
how the structure of negotiations affects the outcomes. This proved to be a neglected area of analysis and
to have important consequences for  theoretical and empirical research which, up to that moment, had
relied on the  assumption of centralised or decentralised bargaining (see Calmfors, 1993 for a  survey).
The topic is being  currently  related  to  coordination  and  synchronisation issues as well as to multi-
unionism (Naylor, 1995) and multi-level bargaining (Calmfors, 1993 and references therein). Further, a8
lot of attention is  being paid to how different structures  might  influence  the  expected  results  of
macroeconomic policies such as rising the degree of openness, deregulating the labour market or
implementing tax reforms (Driffill and van der  Ploeg,  1993; Heylen, 1993; Rama, 1993a, 1993b, 1994).
A second field is that of private information and the role  of  strikes. This stream of research is the natural
extension of some of the  work  carried out in the eighties in which strikes were considered a  form  of
signal  that would  enhance  credibility  in  bargaining  when  there   are   informational imperfections and
sequential bargaining (Chatterjee and Samuelson, 1987; Hart, 1989 examples). Some of the recent
analyses develop  various  sophistications, such as time-varying threats (Cramton and Tracy, 1994);  the
consequences  of centralised and decentralised bargaining with respect to strike frequency  and duration
(Goerke, 1994); the relationship between costs of strikes  and  their length (Card and Olson, 1995); the
effects of  signalling  and  the  incentive structure on the outcome of standard models (Vetter, 1995). 
Thirdly, considerable attention is  being  devoted  to  models  in  which membership is an endogenous
variable. This issue had been mentioned since  the very beginning because many results depended
critically on this assumption. An early theoretical example is  the  equivalence  of  the  utilitarian  and  the
expected utility  functions  only  if  membership  is  fixed  (Oswald,  1985).  Regarding empirical work,
simultaneity and exogeneity biases may arise if  the hypothesis of given membership does not hold. As
was mentioned in the previous section, in the eighties  there  were  some  attempts  to  include
membership dynamics and to analyse its implications for the models. Currently,  the  main  ideas are
related either  to  the  existence  of  an  intertemporal  objective function that links actual employment to
future membership (Jones and McKenna, 1994) or to the simultaneous determination of membership and
wages (Booth  and Chatterji, 1993 and 1995). 
Lastly,  the  effect  of  unions  on  some  specific  variables  such  as productivity, innovation and hours
of work has gained  considerable  attention in the past few years. Regarding productivity, it is argued  that
opposed  to the monopoly "face" of unions, they possess a  productivity  enhancing  facet. This is related
to higher morale; the availability of public services, such as better job conditions or improvement in
information channels; the  involvement of workers in the performance of the firm; the existence  of  a  link
between workers and management without the  fear  of  retaliating  against  those  who complain;  among
others  (Rosen,  1989;  Wadhawani,  1990;  Moreton,   1993).
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Regarding innovation the main question posed is if  because  of  the  fear  of  lower  employment,  unions
would  be  opposed  to  R&D  activities  and   the introduction of new technology (Ulph and Ulph, 1988
and 1994; van Reenen, 1995 are examples). Again, the analyses show that the structure of bargaining  will
have a decisive effect on the final result. Finally, regarding hours of  work, the existence of fixed costs
-and different adjustment costs in the context of a dynamic analysis- implies  that  hours  and  employment
should  be  treated distinctly by the firm. Further, unions have  probably  different  preferences among
various combinations of number of jobs and hours  worked  by  employees. Hence, the inclusion of hours
in the objective function  of  the  union  might have interesting consequences for standard models (Earle
and  Pencavel,  1990; Oswald and Walker, 1994). 
The second main branch of current research analyses the weakness, or lack of robustness, of standard
models when faced with changes  in  the  underlying assumptions, such as those related to the variables
used as an indirect  means of bargaining over employment or to  the  production  function  (Clark,  1990;
Johnson, 1990; Layard  and  Nickell,  1990;  Manning,  1994;  Benassy,  1995). However,  there  have
also  been  remarkable  advances   by   modelling   the union-management bargaining process as a repeated
game, so  that  the  current behaviour of the parties would build a reputation and,  if  it  is  the  case, would
imply agents will be subject to punishment in  the  future  (Haltiwanger and Harrington, 1991;  Kandori,
1991;  Rotemberg  and  Woodford,  1992).  The existence of a punishment for those who deviate  from
equilibrium  strategies could make contracts incentive compatible, and thus  equilibrium  may  depend,
for example, on the discount rates of the agents (Espinoza  and  Rhee,  1989). This, in turn, may be use
to understand the behaviour of employment and  wages in the business cycle (Schultz, 1994). Uncertainty
enters  naturally  in  this setup, as expectations on the future economic performance might have a crucial
role in determining their willingness  to  cheat,  the  credibility  of their threats and the plausibility of their
offers. 10
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